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Abstract
We study the impact on local growth of aid to Malawi over the period 2000–13. Using two
exogenous determinants of within-country disbursement we find a robust and quantitatively sig-
nificant role for aid in causing growth in light density. Constituency-level regressions point to
a larger effect than at district level, suggesting that aid causes a relocation of activity across
space. We find a hump-shaped growth response to health projects. Bilateral aid appears to be
better in causing growth than multilateral aid; grants have an impact while loans do not.
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 1 Introduction
Clear evidence to support the hypothesis that development assistance stimulates economic
growth has been limited.1 Despite this, international development institutions, regional
bodies and individual country agencies continue to allocate large sums to less developed
countries. Between 2000 and 2014, net Official Development Assistance (ODA) of US$1.2
trillion was disbursed by donor countries, US$528.7 billion of which went to the Least
Developed Countries.2
Our understanding of the role of aid in causing growth has long been bedevilled by
problems of identification (see Qian, 2015). Since the allocation of aid can be related to
the growth rate of the recipient it is necessary to isolate exogenous variation in aid to
establish a causal connection. The recent contribution of Galiani et al. (forthcoming)
develops a country-level instrument based on the crossing of the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA) threshold for receiving concessional aid. That study finds an
economically and statistically significant role for aid in causing growth. Aid is not uni-
formly distributed within a country, however. Given the importance of urbanization and
industrialization to growth, it could be informative to examine the disaggregated aid dis-
bursement pattern and the spatially proximate consequences for growth. Recent efforts
to use the Galiani et al. instrument at a regional level (Dreher and Lohmann, 2015) have
failed to find any causal effect on regional growth as measured by nighttime light data.
That aid matters at a national level, but apparently not at a regional level, presents a
puzzle.
In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of aid flows to different regions (both parlia-
mentary constituencies and administrative districts) in Malawi over the period 2000–2013.
We use two determinants of the internal distribution of development aid3 that are based
on the particular institutional and cultural environment in Malawi. Our instruments
exploit the Presidential powers to influence the disbursement of the Malawian develop-
1See, for example, Boone (1996), Easterly et al., Rajan and Subramanian, Doucouliagos and Paldam,
Dalgaard and Hansen, Dreher and Lohmann.
2Data reported in constant 2014 prices and obtained from OECD’s Development Co-operation Report
2015.
3Throughout, by ‘aid’ we refer to non-humanitarian/food aid.
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 ment budget. The first instrument is a variable for ethnic affinity that is measured as
the proportion of a district population that is co-ethnic with the president. The second
instrument is political switching measured as the proportion of Members of Parliament
(MPs) in a district that defect from the party with which they won their Parliamentary
seat to join the party of the ruling President. Using each of these instruments, and both
combined, we find economically and statistically significant evidence on the effectiveness
of aid in causing growth (as proxied by the log change in nighttime light intensity which,
as we show using household surveys, is strongly correlated with the growth of household
consumption). The growth impact of aid is quantitatively significant and robust to a
number of controls. We show that the effect on growth is hump-shaped (with a peak at
a lag of one year). Aid for agriculture and education projects is the most beneficial while
multilateral aid appears to be less effective than bilateral aid.
Our use of these instruments is related to recent work on political favoritism. Hodler
and Raschky (2014) document the existence of regional favoritism in 126 countries. That
study finds a significant effect of a leader’s birthplace on the log of the average lighttime
night in a region. It also finds a positive interaction between aid and birthplace, which
Hodler and Raschky interpret as aid exacerbating the extent of favouritism. There are a
number of difficulties in using favoritism to instrument for aid, however. First, in many
countries the aid budget is only a small portion of the total discretionary budget being
influenced by the political elite. Favoritism may thus capture the allocation of non-aid
spending and bias the measured effect of aid on growth. Second, regions that vote for
a particular leader may do so with the expectation of returns – co-ethnic support for a
President may be on the back of explicit campaign promises of post-election investment.
Third, using birthplace of the leader alone limits the spatial and time variation of the
possible instrument in countries where Presidents can remain incumbent for extended
periods.
A number of features of Malawi over the period 2000–2013 help us address these
concerns. First, aid comprises a substantial portion of the budget controlled by the
President. Over our period of study, aid is 73% of development expenditures in Malawi.4
4Data from Ministry of Finance’s annual Financial Statements.
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 As we argue below, non-development expenditures are not subject to the same Presidential
interference. Second, we show that votes in Malawian elections are not historically along
ethnic lines. Third, the political environment over our study period is particularly volatile
with three different Presidents and three different ruling parties. As a result, we have
substantial variation over time in both of our instruments.
This study makes use of two key datasets. The first is of sub-national allocation
of foreign aid projects which comes from Malawi’s Aid Management Platform (AMP).
AMP contains 623 different projects from 43 different donors comprising US$7.1 billion
in aid (which is 82% of the total over our period). The AMP was initially based on
AidData (see Peratsakis et al., 2012), since it was created using data collected during
the geo-coding exercise conducted in conjunction with AidData. A benefit of using the
AMP is that it contains annual figures (commitments and disbursements) as well as the
planned implementation period as per the project contract. AMP data also includes
information on the project intention (i.e., support of agriculture, health or education)
which allows us to disentangle the effects of aid. The data also takes into account project
extensions or modifications (to, for example, project length or locations). We thus have an
exceptionally high level of information on actual annual disbursements of aid. The second
set of data is nighttime light data which is used to proxy for economic activity. There is
a growing literature that finds nighttime light images can be used as a proxy for output
growth and correlate well with other GDP-based measures of economic growth.5 For
Malawi in particular, we use the World Bank’s Integrated Household Surveys to show that
there is a high correlation between district-level growth in average real annual household
consumption and district-level growth in light density. In addition to these data, we use
district and year fixed effects as well as employing a wide range of district-level controls,
including population density, non-development public expenditure, the poverty rate and
rainfall. We also control for a variety of measures of development need, such as gross
primary school enrolment, the number of classroom buildings, life expectancy, infant
mortality and maize production as well as the number of people in a district that are food
5See Henderson et al. (2012) Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), Lowe (2014) and Storeygard
(2014).
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 insecure.
Our contribution is related to the existing body of literature on aid effectiveness.
After the early work of Boone (1996), cross-country studies have used instruments such as
population size (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008) or bilateral
relationships (Bjornskov, 2013). However, these approaches suffer from possibly direct
effects on growth (see Bazzi and Clemens, 2009; Dreher et al., 2013). Temple and Van de
Sijpe (2015) studies the consequences of aid for macroeconomic ratios. They find that
aid increases consumption and has an impact on investment with a lag. Galiani et al.
(forthcoming) uses a convincingly excludable instrument and identifies a sizeable impact
of aid on real per capita growth. Studies at a regional level have found mixed evidence
of a causal effect of aid on growth. To address causality, Dreher and Lohmann (2015)
use an interaction between a country’s crossing of the IDA threshold and a measure of
the region’s historical probability of receiving aid (see Nunn and Qian, 2013). Dreher
and Lohmann find no effect of aid when using this instrumental variable. Dreher et al.
(forthcoming) find that the effect of short-term political favoritism at a country level
reduces the effectiveness of aid. Our estimates of the effect of aid may be lower bounds
for the true causal role played by aid.
There are recent papers that consider the impact of aid in Malawian regions. Ra-
jlakshmi and Becker (2015) investigates the allocation and effectiveness of geo-coded aid
projects from 30 agencies over 2004-2011. They find that aid reduces disease severity and
diarrhoea incidence while it also increases school enrolment. Dionne et al. (2013) also use
co-ethnicity to understand the allocation of aid across districts. In their study, aid has a
limited impact on health and education outcomes.
Our study is also related to the literature on the ethnic and political distribution of
resources in African countries. Posner (2005), Wrong (2009), Francois et al. (2015) and
Hodler and Raschky (2014) find evidence for the importance of ethnicity in the distribution
of resources (including development aid). A growing literature following Alesina and
Dollar (2000) has found a role for political influence in both the distribution of aid and in
diminishing its effectiveness in generating development (see, for example, Dunning, 2004;
Heady, 2008; and, Jablonski, 2014). We use these insights in the particular context of
5
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 Malawi to motivate our instruments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the Malawian political
and economic context in Section 2. In Section 3 we introduce the data and develop our
empirical strategy in section 4. Section 5 presents our main results first at the level of
193 constituencies and then at the level of the 28 administrative districts. Constituency
regressions permit us to cluster standard errors at the level of the district, while district
regressions allow us to use a wider set of controls. Section 5 also presents a number of
robustness checks. Section 6 considers the effect of aid by project type and investigates
the dynamic effects of aid. Finally, Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Malawi
Malawi is a landlocked country in South Eastern Africa with a population in 2015 of 17.2
million (up from 3.6 million in 1960). With few natural resources, 85% of its population is
rural and relies upon small-scale subsistence farming of the staple food (maize). Over 29%
of GDP comes through exports and over half of that export revenue comes from one crop
(tobacco). Malawi has historically suffered from high poverty, poor health outcomes and
volatile growth. Nearly half (47.8%) of children under five years of age are malnourished
according to stunting data (the average for sub-Saharan Africa is 39.9%. Based on figures
from 2010, 70.9% of the population live below $1.90 a day (2011 PPP).6 The 2015 United
Nations Human Development Index (HDI) ranked Malawi 173rd out of 186 countries.
Foreign Aid
Given the low tax base, and the susceptibility to domestic supply and international de-
mand shocks, foreign aid has constituted a significant proportion of government expen-
ditures. Over 40 multilateral and bilateral development partners7 have contributed an
average 40% of the national budget over the last decade (Malawi Government (2011)).
6Data from Malawi National Statistical Office (NSO), World Bank, and the Human Development
Report (2015).
7Among these are USAID, the World Bank, the Global Fund (to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuber-
culosis), the European Union (EU), and, more recently, China.
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 Figure 1 depicts ODA8 per capita (panel a) and aid as a share of GNI (panel b) for
Malawi against the average for Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) and the average for Low Income
Countries (as defined by the World Bank for the World Development Indicators). As can
be seen, the per capita trend in aid flow to Malawi has followed that to other LICs but,
since it is one of the poorest, aid as a share of income is relatively high. The majority of
aid goes to health, education, agriculture and governance. Over the period of study, 8%
of assistance has been given as humanitarian (non-development) aid.
Politics and spending
Malawi is divided into 28 administrative districts with the capital in Lilongwe. Following
independence from British colonial administration in 1965, Malawi was for nearly three
decades a one-party State. Since 1993, Malawi has been a multi-party democracy with a
Parliament and President elected every five years. As can be seen in Figure 2, elections
have regularly resulted in a change of President and party. However, as typical in many
African countries, a ‘Big Man’ syndrome persists in Malawi – the President has significant
discretionary power and tends to favour a group of trusted co-ethnics (see Francois et al.,
2012). Some of the resources of the State are the patronage of this powerful ruler. In a
country without any notable natural resources, state resources in Malawi means control
over bureaucratic positions, powers to allocate rents (including foreign aid), public services
and determine policies and their beneficiaries.
Important for the purposes of this paper is the nature of the political system as it
relates to control of expenditure. Public spending is divided into the recurrent budget
and the development budget. As we describe below, the Malawian development budget is
that portion of the public spending that is under the influence of the President and this
development budget is three quarters development assistance from overseas.
8ODA is technically the same as development aid, as classified by OECD. It excludes aid to non-
governmental organisations and charitable institutions. It covers all the aid disbursed to governments.
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 3 Data
This study uses parliamentary and district level data for the period 1999 to 2013. There
are 193 constituencies and 28 administrative districts in Malawi (see the left panel of
Figure 3).9 In most specifications we omit those constituencies or districts that were
recently formed or split.10 Further the two major cities of Lilongwe (the capital city) and
Blantyre are omitted from most estimations. In constituency regressions we also omit
each district’s Boma (the constituency in the district that hosts administrative office).
Data on projects financed by foreign aid is from the Aid Management Platform (AMP),
managed at the Ministry of Finance (MoF) in Malawi. The AMP is the government’s main
tool for tracking and reporting progress of aid-funded activities in Malawi and began with
AidData’s Malawi Geocoding Project which was the first effort to compile comprehensive
geocoded data of all donor activities in a single recipient country in Africa. Based on
information reported by both donors and the Malawi Government, the AMP contains
geocoded data on projects from over 40 donor agencies covering 623 projects across 706
project locations. These projects total $7.1 billion (82% of total foreign aid to Malawi
between 2000 and 2013). Figure 3 (right panel) shows a map of Malawi with the geocoded
projects. The AMP data disaggregates cumulative project totals into annual commitments
and actual disbursements of each project in a particular district. For this study, we use
actual disbursement figures. Those projects in the AMP without location information
have been excluded, reducing the number of projects used in this study to 593 projects.
To proxy for economic growth we use nighttime light data.11 Geographers (Elvidge
et al., 1997; Sutton et al., 2007) and ecologists (Doll et al., 2006) first used light density to
study urbanization. Chen and Nordhaus (2011) and Henderson et al. (2012) subsequently
showed that light intensity at night is a good proxy for local economic activity. By
using luminosity, we have reliable data at high spatial resolution for those countries in
9Table 1 gives all data and sources used. Table 2 lists all the districts in Malawi.
10Neno and Likoma districts were formed after splitting from Mwanza and Nkhatabay districts respec-
tively. For these new districts, some data on most of the variables is missing not because they are not
necessarily reported, but rather because for most of the years under study they were still being reported
as part of the districts they were split from. Thus they are entirely excluded but they are subsumed as
part of the parent districts.
11The light dataset is available at the National Geophysical Data Center’s website: http://ngdc.
noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html.
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 which data availability is otherwise limited. Among more recent examples of its use are
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), which studies development in Africa, and the
aforementioned Hodler and Raschky (2014). We use the light data with intercalibration
correction for sensor degration and orbital changes, though this makes little difference
when studying one relatively small country (see Elvidge et al., 2014).
A further advantage of basing our study on Malawian data is that we can check
our proxy for development using the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study
in the years 2010, 2011 and 2013. The Integrated Household Surveys contain a great
deal of information including real annual household consumption. In Table 3 we report
correlations between the log level of light density and the District level average of the
log level real annual consumption per capita and per household. The correlation is high
and consistent across years. Moreover, the correlation between average growth in real
consumption and growth in light density is just as strong. The correlation between the
growth in light density and the growth in per capita consumption is 0.53 over the period
2010–13.
Figure 4 depicts luminosity at the pixel level for Malawi in 1999 and 2010 against the
district borders.12 For analysis in this paper, we calculate average light density at the
constituency or district level (average light intensity per square kilometer) in each year
over the period 1999 to 2013.
At constituency level, we use a number of additional controls including the log of
population and the poverty rate from the National Statistic Office (NSO) census reports.
Data on party affiliations of Members of Parliament, as well as list of Cabinet Ministers,
is from Parliamentary Hansards found at the Malawi National Assembly library. Rainfall
data is from meteorological reports provided by the 22 meteorological stations that form
the weather network in Malawi. District-level regressions permit a wider range of controls
controls. We include data on local public spending excludes aid (since aid is managed
by central government Ministries), infant mortality, life expectancy and rate of food in-
security are from various reports from the NSO. Data on maize yields is compiled by
12Maps for administrative districts are downloaded from DIVA-GIS, available at http://www.
diva-gis.org/gdata
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 the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS). Education data (gross primary
enrolment and number of primary school classroom buildings) is from the Ministry of
Education, Science and Technology. Table 1 gives a summary of the data used in the
analysis and their sources while Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of the variables in the
baseline sample.
4 Empirical strategy
We wish to estimate a light density growth regression of the following form,
∆LDi,t = β0 + β1LDi,t−1 + β2Aidi,t−1 + X′i,t−1β + µi + γt + εi,t (1)
where LDi,t is log light density in constituency/district i at period t, ∆LDi,t = LDi,t −
LDi,t−1, Aidi,t is the log of aid disbursements, X is a vector of control variables and µi and
γt are constituency/district and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the level of the district in constituency regressions, and at the level of the three regions
in district level regressions.
A first concern with the specification in equation (1) is that aid disbursements are
not random. In particular, we may expect that development assistance is given to those
areas with the lowest expected growth, or those that have suffered negative shocks in the
past. Conversely, it may be that, particularly within a country, assistance is given to
those areas that show the greatest potential for generating growth. Second, we may face
attenuation bias since we are using an imperfect proxy for economic activity. Third, there
may be unobserved variables related to both aid and development, that make the role of
aid appear significant.
To account for these concerns we employ two novel instruments that are related to the
discretionary powers of the President to favour those in his/her inner circle but are not,
we argue, related to development through other channels. We thus use our instruments
in the following system,
10
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 ∆LDi,t = β0 + β1Âidi,t−1 + β2LDi,t−1 + X′i,t−1β + µi + γt + εi,t, (2)
Aidi,t = α0 + α1zi,t + α2LDi,t−1 + X′i,tα+ µi + γt + νi,t, (3)
where z is an instrumental variable. For the instrument to be valid, it must be relevant
(α1 6= 0) and exogenous (cov(zi,t, εi,t) = 0).
We discuss a number of potential concerns about the validity of each of these instru-
ments below. One issue that is common to each regards the nature of the discretionary
powers that the President has. It may be that the President allocates a large portion of
State resources in addition to foreign assistance. In many countries, this would be a valid
concern but, by focusing on Malawi, it is less problematic. The Malawian Development
Budget is that portion of the public spending that is under the most influence of the
President. Other departmental expenditure is comprised of recurrent expenses such as
salaries, interest payments on public debt, procurement of goods and services, payment
of pensions and gratuities, etc. There is limited scope for the President to exert discre-
tion on the allocation of these budgets across districts. The allocation of transfers to
districts is determined by the National Local Government Finance Committee (NLGFC)
– a quasi-governmental institution mandated with effective mobilization, equitable distri-
bution and efficient utilisation of financial resources in local councils. Finally, in Malawi,
the Development Budget is 73% foreign aid over the period of study.
Ethnic affinity as instrument
Our first instrument is the proportion of the population in a district or constituency that
is co-ethnic with the sitting President. Malawi people are of Bantu origin and comprise
many different ethnic groups. Malawi Human Rights Commission (2005) finds that there
are about 15 ethnic groups in Malawi. The major ones are shown in Figure 5. The largest
group, the Chewa people, make up 38.4% of Malawi’s population and are mainly found
in the center. As shown in Figure 2, over our study period the President is either Lomwe
(17.6% of the population, mainly in the South) or Yao (13.5%, in the East).
11
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 The relevance condition requires that the instrument be a predictor of aid disburse-
ments. There is already evidence that disproportionate amounts of aid are allocated to
an incumbent President’s district of birth, especially in Sub Saharan Africa. Franck and
Rainer (2012) use data from 18 African countries over 50 years and find significant ev-
idence of large and widespread ethnic favoritism in the allocation of aid resources. As
an example of this in Malawi, Figure 6 shows district-level aid disbursements in Malawi
under two Presidents of different ethnic origins. Despite the fact that President Bakili
Muluzi received a majority of votes in districts in the Southern region, the Yao districts
of Machinga (his birth district), Mangochi and Balaka are allocated disproportionately
higher amounts of aid than any of the other districts. When President Bingu wa Muntha-
lika of Lomwe origin was in office, and despite getting a bigger share of votes in the Yao
districts than he got from his birth district, Figure 6 shows that the Lomwe districts of
Thyolo, Mulanje and Phalombe received more aid than the Yao districts.
One concern with the exogeneity of this instrument relates to the connection between
co-ethnic voting behavior. There is a large literature on the role of ethnicity in African
voting behavior (see, for example, Posner, 2005). If districts supported Presidential can-
didates primarily along ethnic lines then a President’s ethnicity ceases to be random – a
district’s vote is for the candidate that will send the aid their way. If it is the poorest
districts that most vote along ethnic lines, then our instrument is not exogenous.
There is evidence against this clientelistic interpretation, however. Recent studies in
Ghana (Lindberg and Morrison, 2008) and South Africa (Anyangwe, 2012) find no or
very limited evidence that voting is subsumed in ethnicity. For Malawi, we report in
Appendix Table 13 results from a regression of the vote share that a winning candidate
received from each district in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 general elections on the proportion
of the winning candidate’s co-ethnics in a district. Ethnicity does not seem to affect the
vote share that a candidate gets in the district, being found to be statistically insignif-
icant. In contrast, party identification, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the
winning President’s party has a parliamentary majority in that district, or 0 otherwise,
is statistically significant.
Finally, it is important to consider whether there are any other channels through which
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 ethnicity could affect the level of economic activity at the district level. For instance, it
may be that the cultural practices of a particular ethnic group are more consistent with
higher economic activity. To account for this possible channel, for each of the five largest
ethnic groups we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if a given district has a majority
of that ethnicity.
Political switching as instrument
Another determinant of aid distribution can be the desire of the incumbent President
to consolidate their political base. There is evidence that aid is distributed towards
electorally-strategic regions and away from opposition dominated regions (Briggs, 2012;
Jablonski, 2014). Our second instrument is thus the proportion of Members of Parlia-
ment (MPs) in a district that defect from the political party with which they won the
Parliamentary seat to the party of the ruling President. In constituency regressions this
is a dummy variable (i.e., the proportion is 1 if the constituency MP defects).
Political affinity is often viewed in a similar way as ethnicity in African politics.13 In
this view, a leader is constrained in exercising full ethnic exclusion since doing so may
not adequately sustain a coalition of support. In order to consolidate their political base,
leaders look to co-opt other powerful elites, often from ethnic groups in regions distinct
from their own. In Malawi, this co-opting often takes the form of defection (‘crossing the
floor’) rather than the formation of cross-party coalition governments. As in many Sub-
Saharan countries, once the President is in power the biggest barrier to total control is not
having a majority representation in Parliament. Defection is induced by the promise of
personal gains (i.e., public office) and a flow of aid to the defecting MPs region. Districts
that gave the President only limited electoral support may now be favored with aid flows.
Crossing the floor comes with risk for the politician, however. First, Section 65 of
the Malawi Constitution prohibits MPs from crossing the floor. This is intended to keep
the composition of Parliament close to that determined by the vote. By crossing the
floor, they risk their seats being declared vacant. Second, defection reduces the chances
13See Joseph (1987), Van de Walle (2007), Arriola (2009).
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 of being re-elected in the next general election. As discussed, party identification is key
to voter behavior. By defecting, an MP is generally joining a party that does not have a
stronghold in their own district. For example, of the 68 MPs that defected to the DPP
in 2005, 35 MPs came from districts in the Central and Northern regions where the DPP
did not have wide support. Of these, 32 seats were contested in the 2009 general elections
for the DPP and 21 lost their seats.
Despite the possible costs of defection it has happened frequently in Malawi, especially
over the period 2005 and 2012. The need to consolidate political power can emerge when
coups threaten, when a sitting President dies or when the ruling political party is changed
without an election. Table 5 provides the breakdown of the composition by party of
Malawi’s Parliament. The period of volatility since 2005 was the result of non-electoral
events. In 2005, Dr Bingu wa Munthalika formed the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP), abandoning the United Democratic Front (UDF) on whose ticket he contested in
the 2004 elections. The DPP became the ruling party and the UDF, which had won the
2004 elections, became part of the opposition. In 2011, the then Vice President Dr Joyce
Banda formed a new party, the Peoples Party (PP), abandoning the DPP with which she
was Dr wa Munthalika’s running mate in 2009 elections. Upon Dr wa Munthalika’s death
in 2012, she assumed the presidency and her PP became the ruling party while the DPP
moved to opposition.
An example of the impact of the reconstitution of parties on aid disbursement is the
period from 2004–2005. When Dr wa Munthalika abandoned the party with which he
was elected president in 2004 (UDF) to form his own DPP in 2005, the DPP initially had
no MPs in Parliament and had difficulties in passing policies and legislations. Through
inducing defections, the DPP managed to co-opt MPs particularly from the Northern
districts (see figure 7). As can be seen in figure 6, from 2005 some of these Northern
region districts received significantly more aid disbursement than before.
For this instrument to be valid, we require that the likelihood of an MP’s defection is
unrelated with future economic growth in the constituency they represent. The motivation
to defect depends on the type of defector. Independent MPs are generally the first to be
targeted by a power-consolidating leader. They are often easily swayed by the opportunity
14
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 to make quick and easy personal gains, though some may even be appointed into key
positions. As the Table 5 shows, almost immediately after each election, the number
of independent MPs reduce to rapidly to 0 in subsequent years (from 40 in 2004 and
from 32 in 2009). Figure 7 shows that many of the newly DPP regions were formerly
independent. A second type of defector is an influential, veteran MP that has already
served for a long period. For these power brokers, where they lose their positions when
the President changes, promise of re-appointment into the positions that accord them
powers, and development assistance in their district, induces their switching of parties. A
third type of defector is a member of a smaller or breakaway party. Table 4 shows that
the number in ‘Other’ is generally nonzero in an election year but declines to zero once
the winning party attracts them to defect. During 2004 election, National Democratic
Alliance (NDA), which broke away from the UDF after a leadership dispute, won 9 seats
and Peoples Progressive Movement (PPM) (another party formed from disputes) won 6
seats, however by 2005 when the DPP was formed and took power, they all defected and
joined the new ruling party.
5 Main results
We present results first at the constituency level and then at district level. Regressions at
constituency level benefit from a larger cross section and the ability to cluster standard
errors at the district level but limits the set of control variables. District level regres-
sions also permit a series of robustness checks and a wider range of extensions, which we
introduce in Section 6.
5.1 Constituency results
Table 6 reports results using both instruments at the constituency level. All regressions
include constituency and year fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered at the
level of the 24 districts. In Column 1 we report the OLS regression results using all
controls. The OLS result with all controls suggests a positive and statistically significant
connection between growth and the log of aid. Two-stage least squares results are in
15
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 columns 2–7 with a stepwise addition of control variables. The statistical significance
of each instrument in the first stage regression is strong in all specifications. When we
instrument for the log of aid using political switching and ethnic affinity, the size of the
coefficient on aid increases and it is statistically significant at the 1% level across all
specifications in Columns 2–7.
As we would expect, the coefficient on initial light density is negative and significant
in all specifications, capturing a conditional convergence across districts. The log of popu-
lation and the log of rainfall are positively related with light density growth. The poverty
rate is not significant while a dummy for whether the constituency is represented by a
minister and the local vote share for the President’s party are all generally insignificant.
The log of aid disbursements is highly statistically significant in all specifications.
Across all specifications, the Anderson-Rubin p-value is less than 0.05 and the F -
statistic for instrument exclusion is greater than 10. The p-value of the Hansen J-statistic
is between 0.70 and 0.84, so we fail to reject the over-identifying restriction across all spec-
ifications. Results from regressions using only the ethnic affinity instrument are in Ap-
pendix Table 14; that from using only the political switching instrument are in Appendix
Table 15. Anderson-Rubin and KP statistics show that the instruments also perform
strongly individually.
Our preferred constituency-level specification is that in Column 7 of Table 6. This
implies that a 10% increase in aid disbursed to a constituency causes light density to
increase by 6.22% per year. The magnitude of the effect is larger than that found in
Galiani et al. (forthcoming), although that study uses real GDP growth as a dependent
variable. While some of the effect of the aid disbursement may be to re-allocate activity
across space, the results from district-level regressions also support the finding that aid
is causally important.
5.2 District results
Table 7 reports results using both instruments at the district level. In addition to the
baseline controls used at the constituency level, we add the log of public spending since the
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 discretionary power of the President may influence spending other than aid. Regressions
include district and year fixed effects. At the district level, the OLS regression with all
controls (column 1) suggests a positive but statistically weak connection between growth
and the log of aid.
Two-stage least squares results are in columns 2–11. The statistical significance of each
instrument in the first stage regression is strong in all specifications. When we instrument
for the log of aid using political switching and ethnic affinity, the size of the coefficient on
aid increases and it is statistically significant at the 1% level across all specifications in
Columns 2–11. The increase in the coefficient between OLS and 2SLS can be the result
of measurement error. This is common to recent studies on aid and growth (including
Dreher and Lohmann, 2015 and Galiani et al., forthcoming).
Public expenditure (excluding foreign aid) is insignificant, which is reassuring if we
are concerned that an affect on growth may operate through a President’s influence over
non-development spending. Districts with greater population density grow faster, which
is consistent with the literature on urbanization and development (see Desmet and Hen-
derson, 2015). The log of rainfall appears to play no role in explaining variations in
growth. In Column 3 we add the share of votes in the district for the winning President.
Column 4 adds a dummy variable for whether a Cabinet Minister is from that district.
Columns 5 and 6 add measures of education in a districts. The log of the gross primary
enrolment rate is not statistically significant. The coefficient on the number of classroom
buildings is positive and statistically significant in the preferred specification with all
controls (column 10). Columns 7 and 8 add health outcome variables while Columns 9
and 10 add measures of agricultural security and production. All specifications except
that in Column 11 exclude the districts with the biggest cities (Blantyre and the capital
Lilongwe) since, as political and administrative centers, these may behave differently. As
can be seen from comparing Columns 10 and 11, the inclusion of these districts does not
qualitatively affect results.
Across all specifications, the Anderson-Rubin p-value is less than 0.05 and the F -
statistic for instrument exclusion is greater than 10. The p-value of the Hansen J-statistic
is between 0.28 and 0.64, so we fail to reject the over-identifying restriction across all spec-
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 ifications. Results from regressions using only the ethnic affinity instrument are in Ap-
pendix Table 16; that from using only the political switching instrument are in Appendix
Table 17. Anderson-Rubin and KP statistics show that the instruments also perform
strongly individually.
Our preferred specification is that in Column 10 of Table 7. This implies that a
10% increase in aid disbursed to a district causes light density to increase by 1.4% per
year, which is smaller than in constituency regressions. The difference in the size of
the coefficient may result from aid causing some movement of economic activity across
constituencies within a district. Since the standard deviation of the log of aid is 1.1076, the
effect of a one standard deviation increase in aid disbursement is to increase light density
by 15.7%. The effect of aid on growth is, in absolute terms, quantitatively important for
short-run growth.
5.3 Robustness checks
We conduct a number of additional robustness checks at the district level in Tables 8 and
9. First, we may be concerned that proximity to Malawi’s capital (Lilongwe), where most
international donors have offices, could make it more likely that a district would receive
foreign aid because they have lower transaction costs of delivering aid and donors could
have greater exposure to these areas. Further, such districts may benefit from spillover
of urbanization from the capital city and hence have higher light density. Column 1 of
Table 8 controls for distance from each district to the capital and we see no effect on
the estimate on aid. Column 2 includes the land area of each district. To test whether
ethnicity may still play a role in growth, we include a dummy variable for the five major
ethnic groups in Malawi. Columns 3–7 looks to account for possible economic differences
between ethnicities. These include a dummy variable equal to 1 if a district majority of
that ethnicity. The political switching instrument is measured by MPs that switch to the
president’s political party. Since there is heterogeneity across districts on the number of
constituencies, one may suspect that districts with more constituencies (and hence more
MPs to switch) may receive more aid. Column 8 adds the number of constituencies and
18
                            19 / 49
 we see no impact on the role of aid.
Lake Malawi is the center of the country’s tourism industry. As such districts along its
coast may benefit from preferential tourism-specific investments and may have higher light
density than other districts. Table 9 Column 9 includes a dummy for whether a district
borders Lake Malawi. Column 10 includes a dummy for districts that grow one of the
major cash crops in Malawi namely tobacco, tea, cotton and sugar. Since the cash crops
are Malawi’s main source of exports, cash crop growing districts may receive preferential
agriculture aid allocation as a way of boosting production for the economy. The results
suggest that neither being coastal nor growing a cash crop significantly changes the results.
Malawi is divided into 3 administrative regions; Northern, Central and Southern re-
gion. The results in columns 11-13 show that inclusion of regional dummies does not
significantly alter the baseline results. Similarly, a further robustness check concerns the
administrative differences between districts since regulations differ with regards to col-
lection and use of revenues across different type of councils (city and town councils vs.
district councils). Moreover, districts that have townships have a higher proportion of
urban households within the townships. Column 14 introduces a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if a district has a town (or municipal) council rather than just a district
council and we see no effect on the role of aid.
6 Extensions
We have detailed information on each aid project in addition to the geographical detail
including the type of project and the nature of the funding (whether a loan or a grant;
whether multilateral or bilateral donor). Moreover, one of the advantages of our identi-
fication strategy, is that it provides a way of isolating the variation in aid disbursement
to different districts over time. We can thus look to understand impact of aid on growth
over time.
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 Time lags
In a first extension, we look at the effect of aid on growth with a longer lag than one year.
In Table 10, we add lags of two, three and four years, sequentially and then together, to
the preferred specification from Table 7 (column 10). The results suggest a hump-shaped
response of growth to an increase in aid flows, with a peak effect on growth in light density
at two years since the aid was disbursed (that is, aid disbursed at t− 2 having an impact
on growth between t − 1 and t). At three and four years lagged, aid disbursements no
longer have a statistically significant impact on growth.
Project type
Some aid projects in the AMP include information on the targeted outcome for the fund-
ing. Table 11 shows results for those projects that go to agriculture, health and education
(which together comprise 56% of total aid in the dataset). Instruments perform relatively
well for each of the sectors. The largest coefficient is on aid to agriculture which makes
sense given the direct importance of agriculture for the Malawian economy. The growth
impact of aid for education and health projects is lower, though it remains statistically
significant. However, one objective of a health project in particular can be to improve
chances at generating income further into the future. Figure 8 depicts the lagged effect
of aid projects of different types. All types of aid have an effect on growth up to three
lags. The effect of agriculture monotonically declines, while that for education and health
peaks at the second lag (i.e., two years since disbursement).
Funding type
Table 12 reports results of the effect of aid on growth broken down into the type of funding,
multilateral or bilateral, grant or loan. The instruments work well in each of these types
of aid. Table 12 suggests that bilateral aid has a larger short-run impact on growth than
multilateral aid. Individual countries, particularly China, have increased bilateral aid
flows over recent years and these results suggest that the results from those projects in
terms of growth have been successful. Moreover, grants have a greater impact than loans,
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 suggesting that the expectation of future higher taxation may limit the contemporaneous
effect of aid.
7 Concluding remarks
In focusing the disbursement of aid within one country, we have developed a new way of
isolating the causal relationship between the flow of aid and the rate of growth. We have
shown that there is a robust and qualitatively significant impact of aid on contemporane-
ous growth and a hump-shaped response up to two years after the initial disbursement.
The difference between the constituency and district results suggest that aid causes a
significant relocation of activity across space but that, nevertheless, the effect overall is
positive.
The identification strategy we employ is particular to the political and institutional
environment in Malawi. While there is evidence on the role of ethnicity (via birthplace)
in other contexts, the instrument based on attraction of political defections could also be
considered elsewhere. Malawi is among the poorest of the LICs, but the apparent success
of aid in causing growth in this country suggests that some of the pessimism regarding
aid effectiveness that has emanated out of the mixed empirical evidence in recent years
may have been misplaced.
Further study of the consequences of aid using geographically disaggregated data, with
particular attention to unbundling the different types of assistance, could significantly
improve our understanding of the effectiveness of foreign aid.
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 A Figures
Figure 1: Net aid to Malawi and other regions
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Figure 2: Timeline of recent Malawian politics
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 Figure 3: Boundaries (l) and locations of geocoded projects (r)
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 Figure 4: Nighttime images for Malawi in 1999 (left) and 2010 (right)
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 Figure 5: Spatial distribution of ethnic groups in Malawi
Source: Figure from Robinson (2016)
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 Figure 6: Allocation of aid under two Presidencies
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 Figure 7: Map of political change in Malawi between 2004 and 2005
(a) Malawi political landscape 2004 (b) Malawi political landscape 2005
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 Figure 8: Lagged growth effects by project type
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 Table 1: Data descriptions and sources
Variable Description Source Years
Light density Average nighttime light intensity per con-
stituency or district
National Geographical Data Centre
(http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/
downloadV4composites.html)
1999 - 2013
Household Con-
sumption
District level averages of annual real consump-
tion.
World Bank Living Standards Mea-
surement Study, IHS3.
2010–11,
2013.
Distributed aid Amount of aid distributed to each constituency
or district, measured in million US dollars.
Malawi Ministry of Finance’s Aid
Management Platform (AMP) and
AidData (http://www.aiddata.org)
2000 - 2013
Political Affinity For constituency results, this is a dummy equal
to 1 if the MP has defected from their politi-
cal party to join the ruling party. For district
results, it is the proportion of Members of Par-
liament in a district who defected.
Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC)
Reports and Hansards from the
Malawi Parliament Library
1999, 2004,
2009
Ethnic Affinity The proportion of a district’s population that
belong to the same ethnicity as the ruling Pres-
ident. For constituencies, it is the proportion
of the constituencies’ population co-ethnic with
the President, estimated based on the district
averages.
National Statistical Office (NSO) pop-
ulation census reports (http://www.
nsomalawi.mw)
1999 and 2008
Population density Estimate of a district’s population density
(number of people per square kilometre).
National Statistical Office (NSO) pop-
ulation census reports (http://www.
nsomalawi.mw)
2000 and 2008
Public expenditures Estimate of all available financing at district
level including central government transfers,
but excludes foreign aid.
National Local Government Finance
Commission (NLGFC) annual reports
2004 - 2013
Poverty rate Percentage of population per district whose in-
comes are below the international poverty line
($1.25/day)
NSO’s Integrated Household Surveys
(IHS); Demographic and Health Sur-
veys and Living standards Manage-
ment Surveys
2000, 2004,
2010
Rainfall Estimated amounts of rainfall received in each
constituency or district.
Meteorological reports from Weather
stations across Malawi
1999 - 2013
Minister Dummy variable that which takes the value 1 if
a constituency or district is home to a current
Cabinet member, or 0 otherwise
Various reports from the Office of the
President and Cabinet (OPC); Parlia-
mentary Hansards
1999 - 2013
Constituencies Total number of constituencies in district Parliamentary Hansards 1999 - 2013
Distance from Li-
longwe
This is an estimated distance from each partic-
ular district to the capital city (Lilongwe)
Google maps (https://www.google.
co.uk/maps
Total land area Estimated total land area in each district Google maps (https://www.google.
co.uk/maps)
President vote
share
For districts, this is the share of votes that a
winning president received from each district
in a general election. For constituencies, this is
the share of votes for the winning President’s
party.
Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC)
Reports
1999, 2004,
2009
Gross primary en-
rolment
Number of students enrolled in primary school
in a district
Ministry of Education, Science and
Technology reports from the Educa-
tion Management Information System
(EMIS)
1999 - 2013
Number of class-
room buildings
Total number of building used as classrooms in
a district
Ministry of Education, Science and
Technology reports from the Educa-
tion Management Information System
(EMIS)
2000 - 2013
Life expectancy Estimated average life expectancy of the pop-
ulation in a district
NSO’s Integrated Household Surveys
(IHS); Demographic and Health Sur-
veys and Living standards Manage-
ment Surveys
2000, 2004,
2010
Infant mortality Estimated number of deaths of infants (under
1 year) per 1000 live births in a district
NSO’s Integrated Household Surveys
(IHS); Demographic and Health Sur-
veys and Living standards Manage-
ment Surveys
2000, 2004,
2011
Food insecurity rate Proportion of the population in a district who
are reported to have inadequate food to sustain
them throughout the year
NSO’s Integrated Household Surveys
(IHS); Demographic and Health Sur-
veys and Living standards Manage-
ment Surveys
2000, 2004,
2012
Maize production Estimated yield of Malawi’s staple food
(Maize) per district
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Se-
curity’s Annual Crop Yield reports.
1999 - 2013
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 Table 2: List of Malawi districts used in the study
Region Districts (Full sample) Districts (Preferred sample)
Northern Chitipa Chitipa
Karonga Karonga
Likoma
Mzimba Mzimba
Nkhatabay Nkhatabay
Rumphi Rumphi
Central Dedza Dedza
Dowa Dowa
Kasungu Kasungu
Lilongwe
Mchinji Mchinji
Nkhotakota Nkhotakota
Ntcheu Ntcheu
Ntchisi Ntchisi
Salima Salima
Southern Balaka Balaka
Blantyre
Chikwawa Chikwawa
Chiladzulu Chiladzulu
Machinga Machinga
Mangochi Mangochi
Mulanje Mulanje
Mwanza Mwanza
Neno
Nsanje Nsanje
Phalombe Phalombe
Thyolo Thyolo
Zomba Zomba
Notes: The table lists Malawi’s administrative districts. In the full
sample column, are all the 28 districts while in the preferred sample
column has the 24 districts that are used in the main/preferred
specification.
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 Table 3: District Light Density and Household Consumption
Correlations in levels
Light Density PC Cons. HH Cons.
2010 Light Density 1
Per Capita Consumption 0.6048 1
Household Consumption 0.555 0.9796 1
2011 Light Density 1
Per Capita Consumption 0.5201 1
Household Consumption 0.547 0.9586 1
2013 Light Density 1
Per Capita Consumption 0.7254 1
Household Consumption 0.6809 0.9858 1
Correlations of growth rates
∆ LD ∆ PC Cons. ∆ HH Cons.
2010-11 ∆ Light Density 1
∆ Per Capita Consumption 0.7119 1
∆ Household Consumption 0.6434 0.9815 1
2011-13 ∆ Light Density 1
∆ Per Capita Consumption 0.5865 1
∆ Household Consumption 0.5347 0.9736 1
2010-13 ∆ Light Density 1
∆ Per Capita Consumption 0.5228 1
∆ Household Consumption 0.4793 0.9648 1
Notes: All data is from the World Bank LSMS Panel Surveys. All level variables are
in logs. Per Capita Consumption is District average total real annual consumption
per person; Household Consumption is District average total real annual consumption
per household.
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 Table 4: District level descriptive statistics
Percentiles
Obs Mean Std dev 25th 50th 75th
Light growth 332 0.0557 0.4711 -0.2291 0.0232 0.3015
Aid (log) 252 15.6832 1.1076 15.0614 15.7485 16.4323
Public expenditures (log) 336 14.0118 0.9927 13.1956 14.087 14.8704
Population density (log) 336 4.769 0.6449 4.3224 4.8178 5.1567
Rainfall (log) 336 6.8324 0.2999 6.638 6.8243 7.0475
Poverty rate 336 57.9478 13.0458 47.85 59.6 67.2
District vote share 336 0.5475 0.282 0.2734 0.5441 0.8187
Minister dummy 336 0.5361 0.4994 0 1 1
Gross primary enrollment 335 11.5109 0.6026 11.1838 11.4755 11.8864
Number of classroom buildings 335 6.8623 0.3951 6.608 6.8211 7.0825
Life expectancy 336 3.8552 0.0882 3.7865 3.8373 3.9057
Infant mortality 336 4.4389 0.3269 4.2529 4.4015 4.5508
Food insecurity rate 336 48.4574 17.3179 36.05 46.8 61.7
Maize production 336 11.1376 0.6804 10.7866 11.1856 11.5834
Ethnic affinity 336 0.2687 0.3088 0.01 0.09 0.61
Political swithcing 336 0.3403 0.4418 0 0 0.86
Notes: The table shows summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. Variables are
means over 24 districts, excluding the major cities of Lilongwe and Blantyre as we as recently formed
district of Neno and Likoma.
Table 5: Composition of Parliament and Defections (1999 - 2013)
Ruling AFORD DPP MCP UDF RP NDA PPM PP Other Ind. Def.
party
1999 (E) UDF 29 – 66 93 – – – – 0 5 0
2001 UDF 29 – 64 97 – – – – 0 3 4
2003 UDF 30 – 64 99 – – – – 0 0 9
2004 (E) UDF 6 – 57 49 15 9 6 – 5 40 0
2005 DPP 1 74 53 37 3 0 0 – 0 25 68
2007 DPP 1 102 53 32 3 0 0 – 0 0 98
2009 (E) DPP 1 114 26 17 0 0 0 – 3 32 0
2010 DPP 1 147 24 17 0 0 0 – 3 1 34
2012 PP 1 69 24 11 0 0 0 88 0 0 89
2013 PP 1 65 24 18 0 0 0 85 0 0 85
Notes: The table presents data on the composition of Parliament showing the number of seats held by each political party in
the Chamber. (E) denotes a general election in that year. AFORD stands for Alliance for Democracy; DPP for Democratic
Progressive Party; MCP for Malawi Congress Party; UDF for United Democratic Front; RP for Republican Party; NDA for
National Democratic Party; PPM for Peoples Progressive Movement; PP for Peoples Party; Ind. is number of independent MPs;
and Def. is the total number of MPs who have crossed the floor since the last elections. Entries marked ‘–’ are years prior to the
formation of the party.
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 Table 6: Constituency results with both instruments
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Aid (log) 0.1122*** 0.6213*** 0.6206*** 0.6234*** 0.6298*** 0.6219*** 0.6220***
(0.0377) (0.1109) (0.1134) (0.1190) (0.1238) (0.1250) (0.1237)
Initial light (log) -0.4333*** -0.8691*** -0.8692*** -0.8623*** -0.8664*** -0.8629*** -0.8629***
(0.0438) (0.1080) (0.1079) (0.1111) (0.1144) (0.1153) (0.1148)
Population (log) 0.1912 0.1274 0.3411 0.3056 0.3875 0.3875
(1.0112) (1.5356) (1.4714) (1.4916) (1.4424) (1.4429)
Poverty rate (%) 0.0006 0.0038 0.0040 0.0039 0.0039
(0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033)
Rainfall (log) -0.0838 0.0496 0.0459 0.0459
(0.1275) (0.1213) (0.1224) (0.1224)
Minister dummy 0.0598* 0.0729** 0.0729**
(0.0328) (0.0345) (0.0352)
Vote share (%) 0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0005) (0.0007)
First stage
Ethnic affinity 0.5078*** 0.5149*** 0.4889*** 0.4887*** 0.4916*** 0.4977***
(0.1283) (0.1334) (0.1234) (0.1225) (0.1243) (0.1272)
Political switching 0.3274*** 0.3274*** 0.3357*** 0.3276*** 0.3303*** 0.3333***
(0.0621) (0.0624) (0.0626) (0.0617) (0.0613) (0.0614)
Observations 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196
Number of constituencies 155 155 155 155 155 155 155
Number of districts 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
AR F-Test (p-value) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
KP Wald F-Stat (weak id) 27.12 24.48 25.72 25.97 25.69 25.00
Hansen J (p-value) 0.848 0.848 0.687 0.716 0.707 0.708
Notes: The table presents results from regression of the change in the log of light intensity in each consitutency for the period 1999-2013.
Each observation is a district-Year statistic and most variables have been transformed to natural logs. Two instrumental variables are used,
political switching and ethnic affinity as already defined. All regressions do not include constituencies from the two cities of Blantyre and
Lilongwe (two districts, namely Neno and Likoma, are also excluded from the entire sample as they were recently formed after splitting
from other districts). Columns 2-7 use the preferred sample and stepwise inclusion of control variables. Robust standard errors, clustered at
District level, are reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 Table 7: District results with both instruments
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Aid (log) 0.0516** 0.2041*** 0.1690*** 0.1678*** 0.1656*** 0.1642*** 0.1641*** 0.1626*** 0.1645*** 0.1421***
(0.0292) (0.0427) (0.0378) (0.0385) (0.0387) (0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0412) (0.0394) (0.0407)
Initial light (log) -1.0257*** -0.9361*** -1.0573*** -1.0577*** -1.0586*** -1.0595*** -1.0595*** -1.0603*** -1.0601*** -1.0412***
(0.0615) (0.0718) (0.0714) (0.0712) (0.0710) (0.0712) (0.0714) (0.0703) (0.0697) (0.0614)
Public expenditures (log) 0.0462 0.0415 0.1146*** 0.1166*** 0.1152*** 0.1161*** 0.1162*** 0.1172*** 0.1136*** 0.0462
(0.0525) (0.0338) (0.0408) (0.0410) (0.0411) (0.0409) (0.0415) (0.0411) (0.0420) (0.0520)
Population density (log) 2.1545*** 1.2608*** 1.1635*** 1.1617*** 1.1792*** 1.1922*** 1.2093*** 1.3496* 1.3373* 1.3525**
(0.7026) (0.4339) (0.3815) (0.3822) (0.3835) (0.3740) (0.4649) (0.6997) (0.6921) (0.6210)
Rainfall (log) 0.0246 -0.0523 0.0297 0.0276 0.0275 0.0275 0.0274 0.0267 0.0273 0.0567
(0.1044) (0.1117) (0.1077) (0.1087) (0.1086) (0.1083) (0.1085) (0.1081) (0.1081) (0.1039)
Poverty rate (%) 0.0033 0.0030 0.0028 0.0028 0.0029 0.0029 0.0029 0.0029 0.0031 0.0041
(0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0034)
District vote share (%) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Minister dummy 0.0511 0.0121 0.0148 0.0166 0.0169 0.0170 0.0166 0.0348
(0.0331) (0.0332) (0.0338) (0.0335) (0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0341) (0.0272)
Gross primary enrollment (log) -0.0768 0.0213 0.0532 0.0536 0.0434 0.0422 -0.0282
(0.1479) (0.0138) (0.1191) (0.1179) (0.1187) (0.1213) (0.1162)
Number of classroom buildings (log) 0.3024 -0.0813 -0.0816 -0.0639 -0.0487 0.1637
(0.3941) (0.3236) (0.3230) (0.3204) (0.3296) (0.3236)
Life expectancy (log) 0.0034 -0.0010 0.0001 -0.0017 0.0019
(0.0122) (0.0131) (0.0139) (0.0127) (0.0108)
Infant mortality (log) 0.8534 0.2050 0.2088 0.2447
(0.8125) (0.8403) (0.8374) (0.7140)
Food insecurity rate (%) -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0015
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Maize production (log) 0.2590** 0.2562**
(0.1122) (0.1031)
First stage
Ethnic affinity 1.4079*** 1.3984*** 1.3959*** 1.3842*** 1.4095*** 1.4146*** 1.3409*** 1.3430*** 1.3737***
(0.2570) (0.2471) (0.2443) (0.2432) (0.2304) (0.2318) (0.2086) (0.2096) (0.2116)
Political switching 0.5444*** 0.5239*** 0.5163*** 0.5103*** 0.5844*** 0.5850*** 0.5830*** 0.5823*** 0.5753***
(0.1822) (0.1753) (0.1726) (0.1724) (0.1713) (0.1717) (0.1568) (0.1574) (0.1570)
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248
Number of districts 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Including cities N N N N N N N N N
AR F-Test (p-value) 0.0017 0.0028 0.0035 0.0042 0.0034 0.0034 0.0053 0.0033 0.0069
KP Wald F-Stat (weak id) 88.56 87.22 84.42 82.3 53.93 54.4 62.14 64.36 64.06
Hansen J (p-value) 0.351 0.598 0.609 0.612 0.638 0.638 0.632 0.62 0.279
Notes: The table presents results from regression of change in the log of recorded nighttime light density in each district for the period 1999 to 2013. Each observation is a district-year statistic and
most explanatory variables have been transformed into natural logs. Two instrumental variables are used (political switching and ethnic affinity) as defined in the text. Columns 1-10 do not include
the two cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe while column 11 includes the two cities (other districts, namely Neno and Likoma are also excluded from the entire sample as they were recently formed after
splitting from other districts). Columns 2-10 use the preferred sample and stepwise inclusion of control variables. Robust standard errors clustered at district in all specifications are reported in
parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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 Table 8: Robustness checks 1/2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Distance LL Land area Chewa Lomwe Yao Tumbuka Ngoni No. of const.
Aid (log) 0.1397*** 0.1518*** 0.1439*** 0.1322*** 0.1403*** 0.1705*** 0.1325*** 0.1506***
(0.0398) (0.0426) (0.0398) (0.0420) (0.0400) (0.0435) (0.0396) (0.0423)
Initial light (log) -1.0420*** -1.0595*** -1.0435*** -1.0574*** -1.0405*** -1.0302*** -1.0597*** -1.0794***
(0.0614) (0.0591) (0.0618) (0.0588) (0.0613) (0.0612) (0.0657) (0.0593)
Public expenditures (log) 0.0455 0.0882* 0.0461 0.0632 0.0456 0.0635 0.0495 0.0665
(0.0513) (0.0479) (0.0529) (0.0503) (0.0517) (0.0471) (0.0536) (0.0477)
Population density (log) 1.2691** 2.2334** 1.1747** 1.4560** 1.3667** 1.1778 1.2430** 2.1205**
(0.6267) (0.9334) (0.5681) (0.6250) (0.6233) (0.7645) (0.6183) (0.8347)
Rainfall (log) 0.0553 0.0276 0.0541 0.0254 0.0542 0.0732 0.0266 0.0185
(0.1033) (0.0913) (0.1036) (0.0996) (0.1035) (0.1101) (0.1080) (0.0908)
Poverty rate 0.0040 0.0061* 0.0039 0.0064* 0.0040 0.0039 0.0041 0.0045
(0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033)
District voteshare 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Minister dummy 0.0350 0.0289 0.0316 0.0315 0.0356 0.0184 0.0303 0.0376
(0.0280) (0.0289) (0.0265) (0.0286) (0.0276) (0.0252) (0.0271) (0.0272)
Gross primary enrollment -0.0392 -0.0854 -0.0161 -0.0335 -0.0248 -0.0085 0.0139 -0.0595
(0.1253) (0.1304) (0.1274) (0.1280) (0.1163) (0.1296) (0.1172) (0.1236)
Number of classroom buildings 0.1776 0.2945 0.1429 0.1270 0.1503 0.0822 0.0956 0.2749
(0.3322) (0.3462) (0.3364) (0.3401) (0.3234) (0.3597) (0.3179) (0.3376)
Life expectacy 0.0030 0.0163 0.0012 0.0118 0.0033 0.0143 0.0004 0.0072
(0.0110) (0.0155) (0.0099) (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0162) (0.0102) (0.0096)
Infant mortality 0.3070 0.0496 0.1151 0.6723 0.2759 0.2775 -0.3599 -1.0785
(0.7773) (0.7862) (0.6432) (0.7854) (0.7272) (0.8394) (0.9384) (0.8149)
Food insecurity 0.0659 -0.0703 0.0730 -0.0038 0.0715 -0.0273 0.0493 -0.0261
(0.0618) (0.0980) (0.0610) (0.0558) (0.0592) (0.0678) (0.0666) (0.0853)
Maize production 0.2587*** 0.2422** 0.2530** 0.2408** 0.2547** 0.2777*** 0.2391** 0.2346**
(0.1000) (0.0987) (0.1031) (0.1008) (0.1047) (0.1021) (0.1008) (0.1034)
Distance 0.0000
(0.0000)
Land area -0.0000**
(0.0000)
Chewa 0.0072
(0.0143)
Lomwe 0.0484**
(0.0206)
Yao 0.0001
(0.0000)
Tumbuka -0.0426
(0.0260)
Ngoni -0.0244*
(0.0139)
Constituencies -0.0083**
(0.0038)
First stage
Ethnic affinity 1.3479*** 1.3572*** 1.3706*** 1.3834*** 1.3548*** 1.3752*** 1.3946*** 1.3816***
(0.2081) (0.2168) (0.2164) (0.2318) (0.2189) (0.2120) (0.2300) (0.2187)
Political switching 0.6398*** 0.5743*** 0.5799*** 0.5855*** 0.5992*** 0.5799*** 0.5740*** 0.5702***
(0.1635) (0.1636) (0.1634) (0.1635) (0.1649) (0.1713) (0.1606) (0.1580)
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248
Number of id 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Including cities N N N N N N N N
AR F-Test (p-value) 0.0061 0.0049 0.0035 0.0152 0.01 0.0016 0.0099 0.0071
KP Wald F-Stat (weak id) 57.00 53.32 62.90 55.37 62.80 49.50 52.27 56.26
Hansen J (p-value) 0.299 0.390 0.214 0.368 0.347 0.184 0.266 0.602
Notes: The table presents results from regression of change in the log of recorded nighttime light density in each district for the period 1999 to 2013. Each observation is
a district-year statistic and most explanatory variables have been transformed into natural logs. All regressions use the preferred specification with the two instrumental
variables are, political switching and ethnic affinity as defined in the text. In all the regressions, district fixed effects are included and do not include the two cities of
Blantyre and Lilongwe (neither are the two districts of Neno and Likoma). The first column controls for distance from Lilongwe, the second controls for total land area
for each district. Columns 3-7 include a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the majority of the people in that district belong to either of the main ethnic races
in Malawi (Chewa, Lomwe, Yao, Tumbuka and Ngoni) and 0 otherwise, while column 8 includes the log of number of constituencies in a district. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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 Table 9: Robustness checks 2/2
9 10 11 12 13 14 15
VARIABLES Coastal Cash crop Northern Central Southern Urban/Town x-y coord.
Aid (log) 0.1396*** 0.1351*** 0.1444*** 0.1424*** 0.1381*** 0.1408*** 0.1455***
(0.0413) (0.0388) (0.0419) (0.0402) (0.0408) (0.0412) (0.0417)
Initial light (log) -1.0421*** -1.0532*** -1.0360*** -1.0417*** -1.0381*** -1.0799*** -1.0268***
(0.0612) (0.0648) (0.0608) (0.0613) (0.0612) (0.0628) (0.0595)
Public expenditures (log) 0.0501 0.0491 0.0474 0.0462 0.0452 0.0493 0.0468
(0.0519) (0.0508) (0.0523) (0.0529) (0.0510) (0.0493) (0.0436)
Population density (log) 1.5055** 1.1057* 1.4892** 1.2681** 1.4347** 1.9852*** 0.5854
(0.6676) (0.6102) (0.6481) (0.5965) (0.5978) (0.7481) (0.7857)
Rainfall (log) 0.0538 0.0432 0.0613 0.0544 0.0587 0.0414 0.0898
(0.1027) (0.1039) (0.1054) (0.1033) (0.1027) (0.0996) (0.1070)
Poverty rate 0.0042 0.0048 0.0041 0.0039 0.0040 0.0047 0.0058
(0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0036)
District voteshare 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Minister dummy 0.0296 0.0164 0.0325 0.0331 0.0333 0.0369 0.0185
(0.0283) (0.0264) (0.0287) (0.0275) (0.0279) (0.0284) (0.0345)
Gross primary enrollment -0.0433 -0.0064 -0.0164 -0.0230 -0.0380 -0.0625 -0.0968
(0.1212) (0.1251) (0.1145) (0.1271) (0.1255) (0.1210) (0.1281)
Number of classroom buildings 0.1927 0.0949 0.1193 0.1523 0.1614 0.1839 0.1738
(0.3340) (0.3519) (0.3146) (0.3338) (0.3186) (0.3375) (0.3375)
Life expectacy 0.0064 0.0015 0.0048 0.0020 0.0048 0.0083 0.0169
(0.0100) (0.0120) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0112) (0.0127)
Infant mortality 0.3970 0.0061 0.4493 0.1886 0.5419 0.2769 2.2249*
(0.7132) (0.6962) (0.6915) (0.6857) (0.8817) (0.6688) (1.3227)
Food insecurity 0.0365 0.0305 0.0547 0.0699 0.0604 -0.0064 -0.1159
(0.0734) (0.0732) (0.0568) (0.0630) (0.0669) (0.0838) (0.0965)
Maize production 0.2567** 0.2603*** 0.2656** 0.2555** 0.2643*** 0.2597*** 0.3485***
(0.1015) (0.0931) (0.1058) (0.1026) (0.1015) (0.0966) (0.0889)
Coastal -0.0113
(0.0118)
Cash crop 0.0254
(0.0194)
Northern -0.0137
(0.0123)
Central 0.0032
(0.0142)
Southern 0.0062
(0.0161)
Urban/Town -0.0440***
(0.0165)
x-y coord. (4th polynomial) 0.0000**
(0.0000)
First stage
Ethnic affinity 1.3604*** 1.4205*** 1.3594*** 1.3506*** 1.3589*** 1.4281*** 1.3743***
(0.2231) (0.2161) (0.2270) (0.2029) (0.2164) (0.2137) (0.2190)
Political switching 0.5816*** 0.5327*** 0.6042*** 0.6204*** 0.5923*** 0.5092*** 0.5750***
(0.1558) (0.1480) (0.1696) (0.1450) (0.1616) (0.1660) (0.1574)
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 248 248
Number of id 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Including cities N N N N N N N
AR F-Test (p-value) 0.0103 0.0097 0.0098 0.0049 0.0105 0.0123 0.0111
KP Wald F-Stat (weak id) 62.84 59.33 58.58 63.52 56.60 58.58 61.62
Hansen J (p-value) 0.383 0.453 0.271 0.258 0.326 0.919 0.614
Notes: The table presents results from regression of change in the log of recorded nighttime light density in each district for the period 1999 to 2013.
Each observation is a district-year statistic and most explanatory variables have been transformed into natural logs. All regressions use the preferred
specification with the two instrumental variables are, political switching and ethnic affinity as defined in the text. In all the regressions, district fixed
effects are included and do not include the two cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe (neither are the two districts of Neno and Likoma). Column 9 includes
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the district lies along the coast of Lake Malawi and 0 otherwise; column 10 includes a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if the district produces one of Malawi’s any of the main cash crops in Malawi and 0 otherwise; columns 11-13 each includes a
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the district is in either of the three regions of Malawi (the Southern region or Central region or Northern region)
and 0 otherwise while column 14 is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the district is classified as a town council rather than a district council, and
0 otherwise. Lastly, column 15 is specification that includes x-y coordinates of each district (4th polynomial). Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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 Table 10: Lags of aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Aid (log) 0.1392*** 0.2085*** 0.1970*** 0.1364** 0.1150*
(0.0484) (0.0468) (0.0521) (0.0533) (0.0676)
Initial light (log) -1.1353*** -1.1375*** -1.1564*** -1.1786*** -1.1524***
(0.0670) (0.0809) (0.0857) (0.0682) (0.0662)
Public expenditures (log) 0.0263 0.1016 0.1267** 0.1056 0.1725**
(0.0558) (0.0699) (0.0639) (0.0743) (0.0836)
Population density (log) 0.2059 1.7672 0.5263 -0.1138 -0.4451
(1.1123) (1.2848) (1.4198) (1.3598) (2.0394)
Rainfall (log) -0.1059 -0.0992 -0.1568 -0.1036 0.0349
(0.0765) (0.1166) (0.1186) (0.1035) (0.1073)
Poverty rate (%) 0.0020 -0.0044 -0.0139 -0.0003 -0.0116
(0.0050) (0.0079) (0.0100) (0.0074) (0.0099)
District vote share (%) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Minister dummy 0.0244 -0.0078 -0.0402 0.0078 -0.0027
(0.0380) (0.0517) (0.0594) (0.0595) (0.0767)
Gross primary enrollment (log) -0.1133 -0.1769 -0.0651 -0.1575 -0.1464
(0.1306) (0.1454) (0.1551) (0.1444) (0.1683)
Number of classroom buildings (log) 0.4515 0.5552 0.2287 0.5883 0.4309
(0.3504) (0.3874) (0.3930) (0.3790) (0.4326)
Life expectacy (log) -0.0076 -0.0152 -0.0041 -0.0144 0.0003
(0.0084) (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0133) (0.0196)
Infant mortality (log) -1.2200 -0.1772 -0.8676 -1.8286 -0.9377
(1.0785) (1.3167) (1.3244) (1.3564) (2.0355)
Food insecurity rate (%) 0.1410 0.2118 0.1030 0.1903 0.0803
(0.1026) (0.1711) (0.1806) (0.1861) (0.2284)
Maize production (log) 0.3122*** 0.2421* 0.3517** 0.2723** 0.3055*
(0.1203) (0.1440) (0.1688) (0.1319) (0.1643)
Aid (log) 2nd lag 0.0464 0.1387** 0.1441*
(0.0319) (0.0592) (0.0751)
Aid (log) 3rd lag -0.0349 -0.0446* -0.0684
(0.0238) (0.0241) (0.0440)
Aid (log) 4th lag -0.0043 -0.0085
(0.0238) (0.0243)
First stage
Ethnic affinity 1.4150*** 1.4079*** 1.3984*** 1.3959*** 1.3842***
(0.2491) (0.2570) (0.2471) (0.2443) (0.2432)
Political switching 0.5593*** 0.5444*** 0.5239*** 0.5163*** 0.5103***
(0.1756) (0.1822) (0.1753) (0.1726) (0.1724)
Observations 209 188 170 181 158
Number of id 24 24 24 24 24
District FE Y Y Y Y Y
Including cities N N N N N
AR F-Test (p-value) 0.0504 0.0065 0.0115 0.0856 0.194
KP Wald F-Stat (weak id) 91.50 67.56 75.74 60.80 59.87
Hansen J (p-value) 0.374 0.950 0.280 0.383 0.250
Notes: The table presents results from regression of change in the log of recorded nighttime light density in each district for
the period 2000 to 2013. Each observation is a district-year statistic and most explanatory variables have been transformed
into natural logs. All regressions use the preferred specification with the two instrumental variables are, political switching
and ethnic affinity as defined in earlier tables. In all the regressions, district fixed effects are included and do not include
the two cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe (neither are the two districts of Neno and Likoma). Columns 1-3 adds each of
the lags (2nd - 4th lag) separately while columns 4 and 5 involve stepwise inclusion of the lags. Robust standard errors
clustered at district in all specifications are reported in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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 Table 11: Regression results by aid sector
Agriculture Education Health
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Aid (log) 0.4162*** 0.2449*** 0.0963**
(0.1557) (0.0794) (0.0434)
Initial light (log) -1.1966*** -1.2136*** -1.1918***
(0.1488) (0.0956) (0.0647)
Public expenditures (log) -0.1173 0.0559 -0.0296
(0.0816) (0.0757) (0.0672)
Population density (log) 0.0294 1.2889 1.1526
(1.7896) (0.9436) (1.1915)
Rainfall (log) 0.1478 -0.0122 -0.2212
(0.1371) (0.1084) (0.1373)
Poverty rate (%) 0.5668 0.3676* -0.3116
(0.4204) (0.2015) (0.2632)
District vote share (%) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Minister dummy 0.0056 -0.0088 -0.0120
(0.1094) (0.0599) (0.0419)
Gross primary enrollment (log) 1.4834 0.0172 -0.1130
(0.9326) (0.1772) (0.1630)
Number of classroom buildings (log) 0.3095 0.1339 0.3178
(0.5147) (0.4310) (0.4280)
Life expectacy (log) -0.0001 -0.0233** 0.0083
(0.0367) (0.0118) (0.0109)
Infant mortality (log) -1.2303 0.5736 0.7872
(2.2575) (1.2269) (0.9985)
Food insecurity rate (%) 0.0719 0.1927 0.0598
(0.2114) (0.1218) (0.1388)
Maize production (log) 0.2749 0.2484** 0.2966**
(0.1694) (0.1254) (0.1270)
First stage
Ethnic affinity 0.2574** 0.1963** 1.0344*
(0.1879) (0.0821) (0.6106)
Political switching 0.4421** 0.6576** 1.1450***
(0.2535) (0.2944) (0.3287)
Observations 250 195 188
Number of districts 24 24 24
District FE Y Y Y
Including cities N N N
AR F-Test (p-value) 0.0013 0.0032 0.0166
KP Wald F-Stat (weak id) 6.420 8.036 11.81
Hansen J (p-value) 0.837 0.563 0.774
Notes: The table presents results from regression of change in the log of recorded nighttime
light density in each district for the period 1999 to 2013. Each observation is a district-
year statistic and most explanatory variables have been transformed into natural logs. All
regressions use the preferred specification with the two instrumental variables are, political
switching and ethnic affinity as defined in earlier tables. In all the regressions, district fixed
effects are included and do not include the two cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe. The first
column presents results from estimation using aid to the agriculture sector, the second column
has results for aid to the education sector and the final column has results for estimation with
using health sector aid. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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 Table 12: Regression results for estimation using types of aid
Bilateral Multilateral Grants Loans
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Aid (log) 0.2281** 0.1763** 0.2616*** 0.1487
(0.0946) (0.0731) (0.0941) (0.0943)
Initial light (log) -1.1133*** -1.1369*** -1.1517*** -1.1650***
(0.0819) (0.0765) (0.0841) (0.0866)
Public expenditures (log) 0.0753 0.0054 -0.0192 0.0446
(0.0566) (0.0658) (0.0645) (0.0722)
Population density (log) 1.1027 1.2825 0.7268 2.3000*
(1.0502) (1.2706) (1.0965) (1.1737)
Rainfall (log) 0.0551 -0.0018 -0.0069 -0.0884
(0.1230) (0.1227) (0.1004) (0.1086)
Poverty rate (%) -0.1124 0.1397 -0.0556 -0.0889
(0.2021) (0.2800) (0.2337) (0.2537)
District vote share (%) 0.0000** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Minister dummy 0.0376 0.0233 0.0286 0.0249
(0.0690) (0.0398) (0.0408) (0.0422)
Gross primary enrollment (log) -0.3294** -0.0311 -0.2967** -0.1245
(0.1612) (0.1463) (0.1475) (0.1653)
Number of classroom buildings (log) 0.9081** 0.2063 0.9582** 0.3640
(0.4429) (0.3786) (0.4012) (0.4300)
Life expectacy (log) -0.0042 0.0143 -0.0049 0.0129
(0.0172) (0.0114) (0.0151) (0.0116)
Infant mortality (log) 0.8211 -0.1314 -1.2491 1.3030
(0.9178) (1.0318) (1.2489) (1.0694)
Food insecurity rate (%) -0.1602 -0.0077 0.0312 0.0935
(0.1559) (0.1193) (0.1213) (0.1106)
Maize production (log) 0.1733* 0.2538** 0.2749** 0.1701
(0.1005) (0.1199) (0.1189) (0.1124)
First stage
Ethnic affinity 1.1475** 0.6348** 0.9237*** 0.9815***
(0.4767) (0.2881) (0.3283) (0.2857)
Political switching 0.4490* 0.6802*** 0.7766*** 0.3672**
(0.2753) (0.1527) (0.2408) (0.1522)
Observations 211 220 226 212
Number of districts 24 24 24 24
District FE Y Y Y Y
Including cities N N N N
AR F-Test (p-value) 0.0127 0.0677 0.0121 0.224
KP Wald F-Stat (weak id) 5.343 10.33 7.785 10.50
Hansen J (p-value) 0.0661 0.870 0.206 0.298
Notes:The table presents results from regression of change in the log of recorded nighttime light density in
each district for the period 1999 to 2013. Each observation is a district-year statistic and most explanatory
variables have been transformed into natural logs. All regressions use the preferred specification with the
two instrumental variables are, political switching and ethnic affinity as defined in earlier tables. In all the
regressions, district fixed effects are included and do not include the two cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe
(neither are the two districts of Neno and Likoma). The first column presents results from estimation using
bilateral aid, second column has results for multilateral aid, the third column presents results for regressions
using aid disbursed in the form of grants and the final column has results for estimation for aid in the form
of loans. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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 C Additional Tables (for online appendix)
Table 13: Results for OLS regression of district vote share
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Winner’s birth district 0.1230 -0.0014 -0.0061 0.0306 0.0288 -0.0234 -0.0153
(0.1579) (0.1860) (0.1803) (0.1004) (0.1078) (0.1061) (0.1116)
Population -0.9644 -1.3619 -1.2799 -0.9059 -0.5950 -1.0814 -0.7134
(2.1541) (1.9110) (2.2686) (0.8304) (0.8840) (0.7984) (0.8382)
Poverty rate -0.0003 0.0392 0.0156 0.0038 0.0126 0.0212 0.0210
(0.1292) (0.1197) (0.1427) (0.0574) (0.0595) (0.0602) (0.0603)
Northern region 0.0921 0.1035* 0.1008 0.0436** 0.0357 0.0490** 0.0395*
(0.0636) (0.0558) (0.0659) (0.0208) (0.0247) (0.0190) (0.0227)
Central region 0.0403 0.0526 0.0509 0.0255 0.0184 0.0311 0.0226
(0.0692) (0.0610) (0.0675) (0.0246) (0.0249) (0.0233) (0.0234)
Southern region 0.0402 0.0526 0.0508 0.0254 0.0183 0.0310 0.0226
(0.0691) (0.0610) (0.0674) (0.0246) (0.0249) (0.0233) (0.0234)
Urban districts -0.0032 0.0003 0.0003 0.0134* 0.0133** 0.0148** 0.0142**
(0.0143) (0.0137) (0.0125) (0.0068) (0.0063) (0.0070) (0.0065)
Chewa 0.0003 -0.0074 -0.0076
(0.0173) (0.0101) (0.0100)
Yao -0.0001* 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Lomwe -0.0091 0.0047 0.0021
(0.0184) (0.0068) (0.0076)
Winner’s ethnic population (%) 0.2180 0.2346 0.0959 0.0818
(0.1887) (0.1958) (0.0731) (0.0824)
Political identification 0.4771*** 0.4824*** 0.4729*** 0.4781***
(0.0418) (0.0439) (0.0404) (0.0428)
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360 360
R-squared 0.2606 0.2800 0.2845 0.8075 0.8124 0.8112 0.8150
District, Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of id 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Notes: The table presents results of fixed effects panel regression on the share of votes that a winning candidate received during a
general election (held in 1999, 2004 and 2009) from each district on ethnicity, measured as the proportion of population that is co -
ethnic with the winning candidate; and party identification, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the winner’s party is dominant
in the district, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *p¡0.10;**p¡0.05;***p¡0.01.
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 Table 14: Constituency results with ethnic affinity instrument
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Aid (log) 0.1122*** 0.6448*** 0.6431*** 0.6712*** 0.6738*** 0.6669*** 0.6672***
(0.0377) (0.1379) (0.1355) (0.1400) (0.1414) (0.1426) (0.1460)
Initial light (log) -0.4333*** -0.8895*** -0.8888*** -0.9031*** -0.9035*** -0.9009*** -0.9010***
(0.0438) (0.1342) (0.1324) (0.1351) (0.1353) (0.1357) (0.1365)
Population (log) 0.1912 0.1325 0.3685 0.3218 0.4053 0.4049
(1.0112) (1.5730) (1.5491) (1.5582) (1.5081) (1.5102)
Poverty rate (%) 0.0006 0.0041 0.0042 0.0042 0.0042
(0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033)
Rainfall (log) -0.0838 0.0608 0.0574 0.0574
(0.1275) (0.1229) (0.1238) (0.1240)
Minister dummy 0.0598* 0.0739** 0.0741**
(0.0328) (0.0354) (0.0363)
Vote share (%) 0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0005) (0.0008)
First stage
Ethnic affinity 0.6217*** 0.6288*** 0.6145*** 0.6085*** 0.6108*** 0.6131***
(0.1564) (0.1648) (0.1530) (0.1474) (0.1493) (0.1536)
Observations 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196
Number of constituencies 155 155 155 155 155 155 155
Number of districts 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
AR F-Test (p-value) 0.0012 0.0011 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
KP Wald F-Stat (weak id) 15.81 14.55 16.12 17.04 16.73 15.94
Notes: The table presents results from regression of the change in the log of light intensity in each consitutency for the period 2000-2013.
Each observation is a district-Year statistic and most variables have been transformed to natural logs. The instrumental variable used (ethnic
affinity) is measured as the proportion of a constituency’s population that belong to the incumbent president’s ethnicity. All regressions do
not include constituencies from the two cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe (two districts, namely Neno and Likoma, are also excluded from the
entire sample as they were recently formed after splitting from other districts). Columns 2-7 use the preferred sample and stepwise inclusion
of control variables. Robust standard errors, clustered at District level, are reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 Table 15: Constituency results with political switching instrument
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Aid (log) 0.1122*** 0.6051*** 0.6049*** 0.5943*** 0.6015*** 0.5931*** 0.5930***
(0.0377) (0.1574) (0.1587) (0.1561) (0.1654) (0.1653) (0.1629)
Initial light (log) -0.4333*** -0.8551*** -0.8556*** -0.8375*** -0.8425*** -0.8385*** -0.8385***
(0.0438) (0.1421) (0.1405) (0.1367) (0.1435) (0.1436) (0.1430)
Population (log) 0.1912 0.1238 0.3245 0.2951 0.3761 0.3763
(1.0112) (1.5099) (1.4258) (1.4497) (1.4013) (1.4006)
Poverty rate (%) 0.0006 0.0036 0.0038 0.0037 0.0037
(0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0034)
Rainfall (log) -0.0838 0.0423 0.0385 0.0385
(0.1275) (0.1246) (0.1255) (0.1256)
Minister dummy 0.0598* 0.0723** 0.0722**
(0.0328) (0.0341) (0.0347)
Vote share (%) 0.0002 0.0000
(0.0005) (0.0007)
First stage
Political switching 0.3744*** 0.3747*** 0.3832*** 0.3751*** 0.3775*** 0.3792***
(0.0711) (0.0720) (0.0718) (0.0702) (0.0702) (0.0716)
Observations 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196 1,196
Number of constid 155 155 155 155 155 155 155
Number of districts 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
AR F-Test (p-value) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005
KP Wald F-Stat (weak id) 27.75 27.06 28.50 28.52 28.93 28.06
Notes: The table presents results from regression of the change in the log of light intensity in each consitutency for the period 1999-2013. Each
observation is a district-Year statistic and most variables have been transformed to natural logs. The instrumental variable used (political)
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the constituency’s Member of Parliament (MP) defects from the party with which he/she won
the seat to join the ruling President’s party. All regressions do not include constituencies from the two cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe (two
districts, namely Neno and Likoma, are also excluded from the entire sample as they were recently formed after splitting from other districts).
Columns 2-7 use the preferred sample and stepwise inclusion of control variables. Robust standard errors, clustered at District level, are
reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 Table 16: District results with ethnic affinity instrument
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Aid (log) 0.0516** 0.1906*** 0.1613*** 0.1604*** 0.1581*** 0.1567*** 0.1565*** 0.1540*** 0.1557*** 0.1251*** 0.1616***
(0.0292) (0.0456) (0.0433) (0.0440) (0.0443) (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0472) (0.0448) (0.0428) (0.0433)
Initial light (log) -1.0257*** -0.9318*** -1.0557*** -1.0561*** -1.0571*** -1.0579*** -1.0580*** -1.0588*** -1.0586*** -1.0383*** -0.9756***
(0.0615) (0.0716) (0.0708) (0.0705) (0.0703) (0.0707) (0.0709) (0.0696) (0.0692) (0.0608) (0.0609)
Public expenditures (log) 0.0462 0.0401 0.1143*** 0.1165*** 0.1150*** 0.1158*** 0.1160*** 0.1173*** 0.1137*** 0.0462 0.0340
(0.0525) (0.0327) (0.0401) (0.0404) (0.0405) (0.0403) (0.0409) (0.0405) (0.0413) (0.0514) (0.0503)
Population density (log) 2.1545*** 1.3202*** 1.1956*** 1.1924*** 1.2105*** 1.2231*** 1.2433*** 1.4262** 1.4158** 1.5033** 1.1027**
(0.7026) (0.4335) (0.3983) (0.3992) (0.4009) (0.3904) (0.4806) (0.7272) (0.7100) (0.6037) (0.7580)
Rainfall (log) 0.0246 -0.0577 0.0272 0.0249 0.0249 0.0249 0.0248 0.0236 0.0241 0.0506 0.0576
(0.1044) (0.1100) (0.1071) (0.1082) (0.1081) (0.1077) (0.1079) (0.1074) (0.1075) (0.1022) (0.0936)
Poverty rate (%) 0.0033 0.0028 0.0027 0.0028 0.0028 0.0028 0.0029 0.0029 0.0030 0.0039 0.2197
(0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.1872)
District vote share (log) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Minister dummy 0.0511 0.0134 0.0163 0.0180 0.0183 0.0185 0.0182 0.0379 0.0387
(0.0331) (0.0333) (0.0340) (0.0335) (0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0341) (0.0270) (0.0293)
Gross primary enrollment (log) -0.0768 0.0226 0.0516 0.0520 0.0388 0.0375 -0.0373 0.0957
(0.1479) (0.0139) (0.1206) (0.1194) (0.1231) (0.1258) (0.1212) (0.0961)
Number of classroom buildings (log) 0.3024 -0.0737 -0.0740 -0.0507 -0.0354 0.1897 -0.1590
(0.3941) (0.3295) (0.3289) (0.3319) (0.3412) (0.3360) (0.2700)
Life expectancy (log) 0.0034 -0.0012 0.0002 -0.0015 0.0022 0.0227
(0.0122) (0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0127) (0.0109) (0.0179)
Infant mortality (log) 0.8534 0.2633 0.2684 0.3591 -0.5588
(0.8125) (0.8484) (0.8407) (0.6898) (0.8006)
Food insecurity rate (%) -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0004
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Maize production (log) 0.2590** 0.2567** 0.2729**
(0.1122) (0.1037) (0.1110)
First stage
Ethnic affinity 1.8442*** 1.8143*** 1.8019*** 1.7835*** 1.8519*** 1.8568*** 1.7811*** 1.7838*** 1.8146*** 1.8146***
(0.1475) (0.1530) (0.1538) (0.1564) (0.1861) (0.1868) (0.1774) (0.1761) (0.1716) (0.1716)
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 271
Number of districts 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 26
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Including cities N N N N N N N N N N Y
AR F-Test (p-value) 0.0010 0.0028 0.0033 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0061 0.0039 0.0120 0.0019
KP Wald F-Stat (weak id) 159.9 144.1 141.1 133.8 101.4 101 104 104.2 113.6 106.2
Notes: The table presents results from regression of change in the log of recorded nighttime light density in each district for the period 1999 to 2013. Each observation is a district-year statistic and, unless otherwise
stated, most explanatory variables have been transformed into natural logs. The instrumental variable used (ethnic affinity) is measured as the proportion of a district’s population that belong to the incumbent
president’s ethnicity. Columns 1-10 do not include the two cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe while column 11 includes the two cities (other districts, namely Neno and Likoma are also excluded from the entire
sample as they were recently formed after splitting from other districts). Columns 2-10 use the preferred sample and stepwise inclusion of control variables. Robust standard errors in all specifications are reported
in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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 Table 17: District results with political switching instrument
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Aid (log) 0.0516** 0.2312*** 0.1851*** 0.1840*** 0.1820*** 0.1787*** 0.1786*** 0.1780*** 0.1802*** 0.1733*** 0.2011***
(0.0292) (0.0513) (0.0436) (0.0447) (0.0451) (0.0448) (0.0449) (0.0485) (0.0483) (0.0509) (0.0573)
Initial light (log) -1.0257*** -0.9449*** -1.0607*** -1.0610*** -1.0617*** -1.0624*** -1.0625*** -1.0629*** -1.0627*** -1.0465*** -0.9879***
(0.0615) (0.0741) (0.0736) (0.0733) (0.0731) (0.0729) (0.0731) (0.0719) (0.0713) (0.0632) (0.0636)
Public expenditures (log) 0.0462 0.0444 0.1153*** 0.1168*** 0.1156*** 0.1166*** 0.1167*** 0.1172*** 0.1135*** 0.0462 0.0347
(0.0525) (0.0365) (0.0423) (0.0424) (0.0425) (0.0422) (0.0428) (0.0423) (0.0433) (0.0534) (0.0516)
Population density (log) 2.1545*** 1.1411** 1.0956*** 1.0954*** 1.1110*** 1.1333*** 1.1443** 1.2131* 1.1975 1.0756 1.1457
(0.7026) (0.4631) (0.3780) (0.3779) (0.3805) (0.3744) (0.4662) (0.7359) (0.7461) (0.7433) (0.7876)
Rainfall (log) 0.0246 -0.0412 0.0349 0.0332 0.0332 0.0326 0.0326 0.0322 0.0329 0.0677 0.0706
(0.1044) (0.1157) (0.1097) (0.1107) (0.1106) (0.1103) (0.1104) (0.1103) (0.1102) (0.1081) (0.1005)
Poverty rate (%) 0.0033 0.0033 0.0030 0.0030 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0032 0.0043 0.2420
(0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.2031)
District vote share (%) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Minister dummy 0.0511 0.0092 0.0116 0.0140 0.0142 0.0142 0.0138 0.0292 0.0314
(0.0331) (0.0334) (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0346) (0.0345) (0.0347) (0.0281) (0.0310)
Gross primary enrollment (log) -0.0768 0.0185 0.0564 0.0566 0.0516 0.0505 -0.0114 0.1057
(0.1479) (0.0152) (0.1171) (0.1159) (0.1136) (0.1160) (0.1117) (0.0912)
Number of classroom buildings (log) 0.3024 -0.0959 -0.0961 -0.0875 -0.0725 0.1158 -0.1907
(0.3941) (0.3163) (0.3154) (0.3077) (0.3162) (0.3121) (0.2601)
Life expectancy (log) 0.0034 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0019 0.0014 0.0202
(0.0122) (0.0129) (0.0141) (0.0129) (0.0108) (0.0168)
Infant mortality (log) 0.8534 0.1012 0.1027 0.0346 -0.7588
(0.8125) (0.8689) (0.8743) (0.8142) (0.8571)
Food insecurity rate (%) -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0006
(0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Maize production (log) 0.2590** 0.2553** 0.2703**
(0.1122) (0.1022) (0.1095)
First stage
Political switching 1.0576*** 1.0315*** 1.0214*** 1.0082*** 1.0856*** 1.0856*** 1.0492*** 1.0491*** 1.0491*** 1.0491***
(0.1208) (0.1291) (0.1284) (0.1301) (0.1481) (0.1482) (0.1473) (0.1488) (0.1463) (0.1463)
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 271
Number of districts 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 26
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Including cities N N N N N N N N N N Y
AR F-Test (p-value) 0.0002 0.0011 0.0014 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015 0.002 0.0022 0.0027 0.0024
KP Wald F-Stat (weak id) 79.94 66.42 65.75 62.15 55.10 55.01 52.27 53.78 55.66 58.01
Notes: The table presents results from regression of change in the log of recorded nighttime light density in each district for the period 1999 to 2013. Each observation is a district-year statistic and most explanatory
variables have been transformed into natural logs. The instrumental variable (political switching) is measured as the proportion of Members of Parliament (MPs) in a district that defect from the party with which
they won their Parliamentary seat to join the ruling President’s party. Columns 1-10 do not include the two cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe while column 11 includes the two cities (two districts, namely Neno
and Likoma, are also excluded from the entire sample as they were recently formed after splitting from other districts). Columns 2-10 use the preferred sample and stepwise inclusion of control variables. Robust
standard errors in all specifications are reported in parentheses.. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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